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Abstract
We study a two-period model of a duopoly with goods differentiated by quality. The 
periods’ length corresponds to the goods’ useful lifespan, and consumers are het-
erogeneous in their valuation of quality. In the second period, the regulator fixes a 
minimum quality standard based either on the quality supplied by the high-quality 
firm in the first period (strict regulation) or on the average quality supplied in the 
first period (average regulation). Assuming a covered market, we show that such an 
approach leads to decreasing qualities in the first period, and increasing qualities in 
the second one. In both periods, net utility aggregated over consumers is increasing 
and profits aggregated over firms are decreasing. Taken together, average regulation 
always leads to an increase in the present value of welfare, whereas strict regulation 
can cause a decline. If the discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, a policy based 
on average regulation is even superior to implementing the optimal minimum qual-
ity standard already in the first period.
JEL Classification C72 · D43 · I18 · L15
1 Introduction
We study the welfare effects of introducing a minimum quality standard (MQS) 
based on a benchmarking mechanism into a two-period model of duopoly where 
products are differentiated by quality. The related literature traces back to the 
seminal contributions of Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995) who 
assume that the demand side is described by a continuum of consumers differing 
by the value that they assign to quality, and the supply side is given by two firms 
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each offering one single quality. Both firms share the same technology where costs 
depend on quality. Under the assumption of quality competition in the first stage and 
price competition in the second stage, the authors show that an appropriately fixed 
MQS can increase welfare since it intensifies price competition by limiting product 
differentiation. Subsequently, this model has been modified and extended in several 
ways. For a detailed overview see Michaelis and Ziesemer (2017, pp. 620).
In contrast to the advanced theoretical topics dealt with in the recent MQS-lit-
erature,1 we are concerned with the more basic question of how to fix an appropri-
ate MQS in practical policies. Of course, in a first-best world, it should be fixed in 
such a way that it maximizes welfare. In practice, however, any such attempt would 
be hardly feasible due to the regulator’s limited information about preferences and 
technologies. Therefore, we will analyze an alternative approach that relies on a sim-
ple benchmarking procedure. We borrowed this idea from the Japanese Top Runner 
Program (JTRP) which aims at enhancing the energy-efficiency of energy-consum-
ing goods. The JTRP covers 31 products and obliges their producers to establish the 
currently highest efficiency level for the respective good by a certain target year (see, 
e.g., Kimura 2014, METI 2015). Applied to the topic of our paper, this mechanism 
can be described by a two-period model where the regulator introduces an MQS in 
period t = 2 which is based on the qualities offered in period t = 1 . We consider two 
different cases: Under strict regulation, which is perfectly in line with the JTRP, 
the MQS is fixed according to the quality chosen by the high-quality firm in t = 1 . 
Under average regulation, which is a softened variant of the JTRP, the MQS is fixed 
according to the average quality offered in t = 1. The complete time sequence of our 
model is shown in Fig. 1.
If we consider only the first period in Fig. 1, the MQS to be introduced in the sec-
ond period is irrelevant. In this case, our approach corresponds to the standard set-
up of a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition (e.g., Shaked and Sutton 
1982). If we consider only the second period, the MQS is exogenously fixed and our 
approach resembles the standard set-up used for analyzing the impacts of an MQS 
in a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition (e.g., Crampes and Hollander, 
1995). With both periods taken together, however, the MQS becomes endogenous 
and depends on the firms’ decisions in the first period. In contrast to this, the models 
employed in the literature usually assume that the MQS either is completely exog-
enous or results from welfare maximization by a social planner. In virtually none of 
these models are the firms able to influence the MQS by their choice of quality since 
the regulator is the first mover and the firms only react to the standard imposed. The 
only exception is a paper by Lutz et al. (2000) where the high-quality firm moves 
first and makes a sunk investment in quality which influences the standard resulting 
from welfare maximization by the regulator. Hence, our model is related to Lutz 
1 For example, Garella (2006) evaluates the impacts on the incentive to innovate, Lee and Phuyal (2013) 
study market-entry decisions under an MQS, and Cellini and Lamantia (2015) analyze the dynamic joint 
effects of an MQS in combination with price regulation.
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et al. (2000) but we replace the demanding procedure of welfare maximization by a 
simple benchmarking approach which can be implemented in practice more easily.2
The economic rationale behind the timing of regulation in our model results from 
the observation that practical policies often involve a considerable delay between 
the legal adoption and the actual implementation of a new standard (for empirical 
evidence see Lutz et al. 2000). Normally, in this transition period the firms are no 
longer able to influence the forthcoming regulation. In contrast, within a benchmark-
ing approach according to the JTRP, the firms have ample time to shape the impend-
ing standard by altering the qualities supplied. This, of course, gives rise to strate-
gic decision-making. In particular, there is an incentive to lower quality in t = 1 to 
dampen the standard to be introduced in t = 2 . Nevertheless, the following analysis 
shows that a benchmarking approach based on average regulation can increase wel-
fare in both periods. The underlying effects are an increase in consumers’ utility that 
always outweighs the decrease in firms’ profits. In contrast, under strict regulation 
the forthcoming standard is too severe such that the gains in welfare are smaller or 
even negative depending on the discount factor applied by the firms. For the case 
of more than two firms, we find in line with the basic literature on the effects of an 
MQS in oligopoly (Scarpa 1998; Pezzino 2010) that welfare will decrease under 
both regulatory schemes.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the 
model and in Sect. 3, we calculate the unregulated equilibrium. In Sect. 4, we derive 
the regulated equilibria for two different benchmarking approaches. In Sect. 5, we 
analyze the resulting welfare effects and compare them to the outcome obtained 
from applying the optimal MQS. In Sect. 6, we briefly consider the case of more 
than two firms, and finally in Sect. 7 we discuss our main conclusions.
2  The model
Due to the complexity added by the dynamics to be considered below, we keep our 
model as simple as possible.3 The time horizon covers two periods t = 1, 2 where 
the length of each period corresponds to the useful lifespan of the considered goods. 
There exist two firms j = H, L each producing a single variant differentiated by 
quality qjt ≥ 0 . Without loss in generality, we assume qHt ≥ qLt , i.e., firm H is the 
high- and firm L is the low-quality producer. The price of variant j in period t is 
denoted by pjt . Both firms share the same technology where costs per unit are inde-
pendent of quantity but increasing in quality. In line with several other studies on 






 with 𝛾 > 0.
2 A modified version of the model can also be used to analyze energy efficiency standards based on 
benchmarking according to the JTRP (see Michaelis and Ziesemer 2017).
3 Except for its dynamic structure with an endogenous MQS and the use of a quadratic instead of a 
general cost function, our model basically resembles the approach presented by Crampes and Hollander 
(1995).
4 See, e.g., Motta (1993), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), Napel and Oldehaver (2011), He (2014), Lutz 
and Pezzino (2014), Birg and Voßwinkel (2015) and Cavaliere and Crea (2017).
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The demand side consists of a unit mass of consumers indexed by i , each buy-
ing one unit per period. The net utility of consumer i buying variant j in period 
t is given by u + iqjt − pjt . The term u indicates a baseline utility independ-
ent of quality which is assumed to be sufficiently large to ensure that the market 
is always completely covered (see, e.g., Kuhn 2007).5 Moreover, i which is dis-
tributed uniformly on the interval i ∈ [a, a + z] with a ≥ 0 and z > 0 repre-
sents the individual valuation of quality by the consumer i . Solving the equation 
u + iqHt − pHt = u + iqLt − pLt for i yields the indifferent consumer’s position in 













∕z for firm L and sHt = 1 − sLt =
(
a + z − ?̂?t
)
∕z for firm H.
In each period, firms compete in two stages: In the quality game in stage one, they 
simultaneously choose qualities qjt , and in the price game in stage two they simulta-
neously choose prices pjt . In period t = 1 there is no regulation of quality, whereas 
in period t = 2 an MQS denoted by q is introduced. Strict regulation implies q = qH1 




∕2 . The solution concept is subgame 
perfect equilibrium, i.e., we solve the model backwards.
3  Unregulated equilibrium
Without regulation, there are no dynamic effects and the equilibria in both periods 
will be identical. Hence, it suffices to calculate the equilibrium for a representative 
period t . As can easily be checked for the price game in the second stage, 
Period t=1 Period t=2
t
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8
Step 5: Regulator calculates the standard and
obliges the firms to comply with it
Step 6: Firms simultaneously decide on 
qualities
Step 7: Firms simultaneously decide on prices
Step 8: Consumers decide which product to buy
Step 1: Information on the impending standard 
and its calculation becomes public
Step 2: Firms simultaneously decide on 
qualities
Step 3: Firms simultaneously decide on prices
Step 4: Consumers decide which product to buy
Fig. 1  Time sequence of the model
5 The implications of assuming a covered market will be discussed in more detail in sections 5 and 7. 
We are aware that this assumption considerably limits the scope of our analysis. However, if we allow for 
an uncovered market, our model is solvable only in numerical applications.
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 and solving the resulting reaction 
functions for the prices pjt yields:
Inserting (1) and (2) into ?̂?t as calculated in Sect. 2 yields the indifferent consum-











The corresponding market shares are:
Hence, a duopoly equilibrium with both firms active in the market (which is the 









> 0 for j = H, L . In the next step, the reduced profit functions that we 
need for the quality game in the first stage can be calculated by inserting (1) to (4) 





















∕𝜕qLt > 0 qualities are strategic comple-
ments. Solving (7) and (8) for qjt yields qoLt = (4a − z)∕8 and q
o
Ht
= (4a + 5z)∕8.67  




 represent the 
equilibrium only if z ≤ 4a . In contrast, for z > 4a the consumers’ preferences are 
too heterogeneous and our model leads to a corner solution where the firm L always 
chooses q̃o
Lt
= 0 and firm H chooses q̃o
Ht






































































































a + 2z + qLt
)/
3 .
6 In the following, we indicate the unregulated case by the superscript o, the case of strict regulation by 











 proves that the second order condi-
tions are satisfied. Moreover,  Appendix A.1 shows that leapfrogging can be ruled out.
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In the following, we concentrate on the more interesting case of an interior solution 















8a(2a + 5z) + 49z2
]
∕64 . 
Moreover, it can easily be calculated that the indifferent consumer is located at the center 
of the market, i.e. ?̂?o
t
= a + (z∕2) , and the market shares are so
jt
= 1∕2 with profits of 
o
jt
= 3z2∕16 for j = H, L . Hence, everything else equal, the higher the degree of het-
erogeneity in consumers’ preferences (given by the parameter z ), the higher the firms’ 
profits are. The economic explanation is straightforward: Preferences that are more het-
erogeneous increase the importance of differences in quality from the viewpoint of con-
sumers. This, in turn, relaxes price competition and increases profits (see, e.g., Shaked 
and Sutton 1982).
4  Regulated equilibria
Before analyzing the equilibria for strict regulation with qs = qH1 and average regu-




∕2 , it is useful to consider the general effects of intro-
ducing a binding standard q > qo
Lt
 in period t . Concerning the price game in the 
second stage, there is no difference from the unregulated case analyzed above. How-
ever, in the quality game in the first stage, the standard forces firm L to increase 










a + 2z + q
)
∕3 








 into the reduced 





 with the unregulated profit o
Ht









 such that firm H is worse off under the standard. In contrast, 

















Hence, firm L gains from the standard as long as it is not too severe and satisfies the 
condition q < q̂ . The economic intuition is based on two effects: First, both firms 
suffer since the standard limits the scope for product differentiation and tightens 
price competition. Second, as already emphasized by Ronnen (1991, p.500) and 
Crampes and Hollander (1995, p.76), the standard applied enables firm L to commit 
to quality which has the same effect as granting a first-mover advantage to it. If the 
standard satisfies q < q̂ , firm L′s advantage from the commitment effect outweighs 







a + 2z − 2q
)(
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4.1  Strict regulation
Replacing q in (9) and (10) for t = 2 by the strict standard qs = qH1 yields the firms’ 
second-period profits solely as a function of firm H′s decision on quality in period 
t = 1:
With their decisions in t = 1 , both firms j = H, L aim at maximizing the present 














.8 The parameter 
 ∈ (0, 1] indicates the discount factor. In the following, we use the abbreviation 
 ∶=
√
9 − 8 for simplifying terms. It should carefully be noted that  is a strictly 
decreasing function of  with  ∈ [1, 3).






















(a + 2z) + 3qL1
]
∕(3 + 2) . 
For firm L we obtain the same reaction function as in the unregulated case because L 
is not able to influence the second-period outcome via the choice of qL1 . In contrast, 
the new reaction function of firm H implies that for any given qL1 firm H will choose 










 . The eco-
nomic rationale is obvious since everything else equal the profits of firm H in period 











 for qj1 yields the qualities resulting in period 
t = 1 under strict regulation9:
In the following, we again concentrate on the more interesting case of an interior 
solution.10 Comparing qs
j1
 with the outcome of the unregulated case reveals that both 




 . The economic reasoning is that firm H 







a + 2z − 2qH1
)(














(13)qsL1 = [a(1 + ) − z]∕2(1 + ),
(14)qsH1 = [a(1 + ) + z(2 − 1)]∕2(1 + ).




 , still follow from inserting t = 1 into the reduced 












 proves that the second order con-
ditions are satisfied. Moreover, Appendix A.1 shows that leapfrogging can be ruled out for both periods 
if leapfrogging by firm L in t = 1 leads to positive but arbitrarily small costs.
10 Due to  ∈ [1, 3) , a sufficient condition for such an interior solution is z ≤ 2a . In contrast, for z > 2a a 
corner solution with q̃s
L1
= 0 and q̃s
H1
= 𝜆(a + 2z)∕𝛾(3 + 2𝜆) cannot be ruled out depending on the mag-
nitude of the discount factor .
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profits, and this decrease in qH1 induces firm L also to reduce its quality since quali-
ties are strategic complements.



















 . The economic rationale for this result is 
the assumption 𝜕2c(q)∕𝜕q2 > 0 which implies for any qH > qL that improving qual-
ity is more costly for firm H than for firm L (see also Ronnen 1991, p.498).




 into (1) and (2) for t = 1 we obtain the 
equilibrium prices:




 . From an 
economic point of view, this result does not come as a surprise since production 


















 into (3)–(6) yields market shares of 
ss
L1




=(3 + 𝜆)∕3(1 + 𝜆)>so
H1
 with accompanying profits 
of 𝜋s
L1




= z2𝜆(3 + 𝜆)2∕9𝛾(1 + 𝜆)3 > 𝜋o
H1
 . Hence, 
despite the intensified price competition, in t = 1 the high-quality firm gains from 
the regulation. The economic reason is obvious: Analogous to the findings of Ron-
nen (1991, p. 500) and Crampes and Hollander (1995, p.76), firm H′s influence on 
the forthcoming standard enables it to commit to quality and this advantage out-
weighs its disadvantage caused by the more intense price competition.




 such that the 







 into firm H′s reaction function (8) for t = 2 yields:













Hence, qualities increase and the degree of product differentiation decreases again. 
























(17)qsL2 = [a(1 + ) + z(2 − 1)]∕2(1 + ).
(18)qsH2 = [a(1 + ) + z(2 + 1)]∕2(1 + ).
(19)psL2 =
[












3a2(1 + )2 + 6az(1 + )(2 + 1) + [11 + 12(1 + )]z2
]/
12(1 + )2.
11 Note that qs − qo
L2
= 3z(3 − 1)∕8(1 + ) . Hence, qs > qo
L2
 holds for any  ∈ [1, 3).
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At first glance, the standard’s impact on prices in t = 2 is ambiguous because 
qualities and production costs increase but product differentiation decreases. How-
ever, as shown in Appendix A.2, for the case of an interior solution the effect of a 
smaller product differentiation dominates such that prices will increase in total.
Next, inserting qs
j2
 into (3)–(6) yields market shares of ss
L2





= 2∕3(1 + 𝜆)<so
H2
 with profits of s
L2
=z2(1 + 3)2∕9(1 + )3 and 
s
H2









 depends on the 















∕18 ≈ 0.350 . The economic explanation of this result is 
straightforward: From the discussion at the beginning of Sect. 4, we already know 
that firm L is better off under a minimum quality standard that is not too severe. 
However, if the discount factor falls short of the threshold 𝛿 , the adaption of quality 
by firm H in period t = 1 will be too weak. Therefore, the standard introduced in 
t = 2 will be too high and the profit of firm L will decrease because its disadvantage 
from an intensified price competition outweighs its advantage from being able to 
commit to quality.
The analysis presented so far, however, entails a possible caveat that should care-







 is indeed a Nash-equilibrium it must 
hold that none of the two firms has an incentive to change its quality as long as the 
other firm sticks to qs
j1
 . Concerning firm L this condition is obviously satisfied since 
L is not able to influence the forthcoming standard. In contrast, firm H could choose 
a quality qH1 ≤ qoLt such that the standard in the second period is non-binding. Com-
pared to qs
H1
 this would lead to a smaller degree of product differentiation and H1 
would decrease whereas H2 would increase up to the unregulated level oH2 . In 







 is indeed a Nash-equilibrium.
Before proceeding to summarize our key findings in Proposition  1, we note 
that for the sake of clarity we display all thresholds regarding the discount factor 
 in our Propositions as numerical figures rounded to three digits. We chose this 
approach because the formulas describing the exact magnitudes of the thresholds are 
extremely complex since they result from solving power equations of a higher order.
Proposition 1 Introducing a standard qs = qH1 in t = 2 induces a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium with qualities qs
jt
 according to (13), (14), (17) and (18). A com-
parison with the unregulated case reveals the following effects (see Appendix A.2):
















  for 
t = 1, 2.








  for j = H, L.
12 We are particularly grateful to one of the referees for bringing this problem to our attention.
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if 𝛿 > 0.350
< 𝜋o
L2
if 𝛿 < 0.350
.
Finally, we note that everything else equal, the effects described in Proposition 1 
are in period t = 1 the weaker and in period t = 2 the stronger, the lower is the dis-
count factor  . The economic intuition behind this result is clear: Lowering the dis-
count factor reduces the weight attached to the outcome in the second period. This, 
in turn, diminishes the incentive for a pre-emptive lowering of qualities in the first 
period and strengthens the standard imposed in the second period.
4.2  Average regulation
We now turn to the case of average regulation. The main difference to strict reg-
ulation relates to the additional strategic incentive stemming from firm L′s abil-







∕2 yields the firms’ second-period profits as a function of their 
decisions on quality in period t = 1:




 , still follow from inserting t = 1 into 





















∕qj1 = 0 we obtain the following reaction functions with 








As indicated by (24), the reaction function of firm H is still linearly increasing in 
qL1 but its slope has changed. Compared to the reaction function under strict regula-
















∕4 ≈ 0.932 . 
Hence, for a wide range of possible discount factors firm H reacts stronger to a 
change in qL1 to compensate for its partial loss of control over the forthcoming 
standard.
With qL1 drawn at the vertical axis, the reaction function of firm 

















































































13 To ensure comparability with the last section, we again use the abbreviation  ∶= (9 − 8)0.5.
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q̃H1 =
[













∕24𝛾 . The economic rationale 
behind this shape is that a decrease in qH1 induces two opposite effects on the opti-
mal decision of firm L . On the one hand, a decrease in qH1 leads to an incentive to 
reduce qL1 to maintain a certain level of product differentiation. This is the same 
mechanism as under strict regulation. On the other hand, however, there is now also 
an incentive to increase qL1 because within a certain range a higher standard intensi-
fies firm L′s advantage from being able to commit to quality in t = 2.14 Hence, for 
qH1 > q̃H1 the former incentive dominates over the latter one, whereas for qH1 < q̃H1 
the opposite holds.15
Solving the above reaction functions (23) and (24) for qj1 leads to the qualities 









∕2 yields the standard to be 














]1∕2 . Due to qa > qo
L2
 for  ∈ [1, 3) this standard is binding 
for firm L . Consequently, we obtain:
Moreover, inserting qa
L2
 into firm H′s reaction function (8) for t = 2 yields:
The remaining lines of calculation concerning prices, market shares and prof-
its are the same as in Sect.  4.1. We, therefore, confine ourselves to summa-






)]1∕2 and  ∶= 63 −  − 2 for simplifying terms. In t = 1 , 













































































∕𝜕q > 0 as long as q lies within the range qo
L2
< q < (2a + z)∕4𝛾.
15 Moreover, since L′s commitment-advantage becomes effective not before t = 2 we obtain 
𝜕q̃H1∕𝜕𝛿 > 0 such that the turning point q̃H1 occurs the earlier, the lower is the discount factor.












 proves that the second order conditions are satisfied. 
Moreover, in Appendix A.1 we show that leapfrogging can be ruled out.
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9 + 2 + 
)
∕72,17 and the 















∕4478976 . For t = 2 , we obtain prices of:




45 + 2 + 
)
∕108 , and the accom-









Finally, in Appendix A.3 we proof analogously to the case of strict regulation 
that none of the two firms has an incentive to strive or a non-binding standard. Prop-
osition 2 summarizes our key findings from comparing average regulation with the 
unregulated case:




∕2 in t = 2 induces a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium with qualities according to (25)–(28). A comparison 
with the unregulated case reveals the following effects (see Appendix A.3):
















  for 
t = 1, 2.








  for j = H, L.





if 𝛿 > 0.696
> 𝜋o
H1














As expected, a comparison of Propositions  1 and 2 shows that the general 
impacts of both regulations are quite similar: qualities decrease in the first period 
and increase in the second period, whereas product differentiation decreases in both 
periods. The only differences relate to the change in the firms’ profits compared to 
the unregulated equilibrium. In contrast to strict regulation, firm H′s profit in t = 1 
will now decrease if the discount factor is sufficiently high, and firm L′s profit in 
t = 2 will now always increase. The economic reason is that switching from strict to 
average regulation advantages firm L and disadvantages firm H which is no longer 

































































17 Remind that the market share of firm H is always sHt = 1 − sLt since we consider a covered market.
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 (see Proposition 3 below) the standard under aver-





5  Welfare analysis












 . The 
first summand indicates profits aggregated over both firms and the second summand 
indicates net utility aggregated over consumers. Aggregated profits can easily be 
calculated by adding up the reduced profit functions [5] and [6]:
To derive aggregated net utility, we start with the observation that consum-




 buy variant L , whereas consumers char-




 buy variant H. Since i is distributed uniformly 











 , and the position of the average consumer 






a + z + ?̂?t(qLt, qHt)
]
 . Consequently, the net util-






















 and adding up over both variants j = L,H yields the con-
sumers’ aggregated net utility:
 











a + 2z + q
)
∕3 into (33), (34) and add-









∕q = 0 for q and verifying the second-order 
condition yields:
Due to q∗ > qo
Lt













∕80 . However, before proceeding, it 
is important to note that applying q∗ will increase welfare but it will not lead to the 




.18 The economic rea-
son is that the introduction of an MQS only allows the regulator to directly control 

















































18 The latter can easily be calculated from our model as q∗∗
Lt
= (4a + z)∕8 and q∗∗
Ht
= (4a + 3z)∕8.
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(8) such that for any quality qLt enforced by an MQS the corresponding quality qHt is 
predetermined. Hence, like strict or average regulation, even an optimized MQS is 
also only a second best solution.
Comparing q∗ with qs reveals qs > q∗ for  ∈ (0, 1] . Hence, under strict regulation 
the standard is always too severe compared to the optimal one. In contrast, for aver-
age regulation we obtain qa < q∗ if 𝛿 >
⌣










∕160 ≈ 0.806 (see Appendix A.4 for both results).
In the following welfare analysis, we compare strict and average regulation not 
only with each other but also with the (hypothetical) case that the regulator has 
complete information about the firms’ cost functions and the consumers’ prefer-
ences and introduces the optimal standard q∗ already in period t = 1 . As a pre-req-
uisite, Proposition 3 summarizes our results from comparing qualities and product 
differentiation:
Proposition 3 Comparing the regulatory schemes’ impacts on the qualities supplied 










 for j = H, L as well as (see 
Appendix A.4):
Moreover, concerning the degree of product differentiation, denoted by 












Based on our previous analysis, most of the results stated in Proposition 3 are not 
surprising. Concerning the first period, however, we find for a sufficiently small dis-
count factor that the pre-emptive reduction in quality is under average regulation 




 ). In this case, the less stringent 
regulation leads to the stronger adaption in t = 1 . The economic reason for this 
somewhat unexpected result is the joint-effect caused by the impact of discounting 
on the firms’ reaction functions as discussed above. In particular, lowering the dis-
count factor increases firm L′s incentive to lower quality and at the same time firm 
H′s reaction to a decrease in qL1 becomes stronger compared to the case of strict 
regulation. Both effects reinforce each other in diminishing qualities.
Next, inserting the equilibrium-qualities calculated above for the unregulated 
case as well as for the different standards into (33) yields the firms’ aggregated 




























































if 𝛿 > 0.806.
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Proposition 4 Denoting profits aggregated over firms in period t by Πt and com-









} for t = 1, 2 and (see Appendix A.5):
Compared to the unregulated case, firms’ aggregated profits are decreasing in 
both periods and under each of the standards considered. Moreover, a direct com-
parison between strict and average regulation reveals that the decrease in aggre-
gated profits under average regulation is in the first period stronger than under 
strict regulation whereas in the second period the opposite holds. The economic 
explanation are the standards’ different impacts on the degree of product differen-
tiation and the intensity of price competition as stated in Proposition 3: In t = 1 , 
average regulation leads to a lower degree of product differentiation (implying a 
more intense price competition) than strict regulation, and in t = 2 the reverse is 
true.
Finally, the ranking between strict or average regulation on the one hand and the 
optimal standard, on the other hand, depends on the discount factor  . In general, 
the higher the discount factor, the more likely is the optimal standard superior in the 
first period, and the opposite holds in the second period.
We now turn to the demand side. Inserting the equilibrium-qualities calculated 
above into (34) yields the consumers’ aggregated net utility. By comparing the 
resulting expressions, we derive Proposition 5:
Proposition 5 Denoting net utility aggregated over consumers in period t by Ut and 









} for t = 1, 2 and (see Appendix A.6):
Compared to the unregulated case, consumers ‘aggregated net utility is increasing 
in both periods and under each of the standards considered. The economic reason is 
obvious: In the first period, under strict or average regulation the positive effects 
of decreasing prices dominate the negative effects of decreasing qualities, whereas 
under the optimal standard the positive effects of increasing qualities dominate the 
negative effects of increasing prices. In the second period, the latter relation between 
positive and negative effects holds under the optimal standard as well as under strict 
or average regulation.
Moreover, a direct comparison between strict and average regulation shows that 
in the first period average regulation is always superior. In contrast, in the second 
period the relation depends on the discount factor: The higher  , the more likely 






















































































if 𝛿 > 0.806.
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between strict or average regulation on the one hand and the optimal standard, 
on the other hand, depends on the discount factor: In the first period, increasing  
diminishes the relative attractiveness of the optimal standard, whereas in the second 
period there is no uniform pattern.
Next, we consider welfare in period t. Inserting the equilibrium-qualities calcu-




 and comparing the expressions obtained leads to Propo-
sition 6:
Proposition 6 Denoting welfare in period t by Wt and comparing the effects of the 
different standards with each other as well as with the unregulated case reveals (see 
Appendix A.7):










Hence, compared to the unregulated situation, average regulation is beneficial in 
both periods since the consumers’ increase in net utility dominates the firms’ losses 
in profits. In contrast, the increase in welfare caused by strict regulation is always 
smaller compared to average regulation and can even become negative in the second 
period. The latter occurs if the discount factor falls short of the threshold  ≈ 0.901 . 
In this case, the reduction of quality by firm H in period t = 1 is not strong enough 
such that the standard introduced in period t = 2 will be too severe. The economic 
rationale behind this result is in line with Crampes and Hollander (1995, p. 77) who 
conclude that an MQS “sufficiently close to the quality chosen by the low-quality 
producer in the unregulated equilibrium” can improve welfare.
Moreover, a comparison with the welfare effects of the optimal standard q∗ leads 
for t = 1 to the (possibly surprising) result that average regulation is superior to 
applying q∗ if the discount factor exceeds the threshold  ≈ 0.520 . In this case, the 
reduction in qualities (accompanied by lower prices) induced under average regula-
tion is more beneficial than the increase in qualities (accompanied by higher prices) 
enforced by the optimal standard. The economic background of this result is the 
above-mentioned observation that average regulation as well as applying the opti-
mal standard are both only second-best solutions. Hence, there is no a priori reason 
to suppose that one of these solutions is always superior to the other.
In the last step, we consider the standards, impact on the present value of total 





































if 𝛿 > 0.901.













 are U-shaped with a minimum of ΔWs
1






∕9 ≈ 0.898 and ΔWa
2







20 This calculation implies that the social planner applies the same discount factor as the firms to evalu-
ate the welfare effects of the MQS.
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equilibrium-qualities calculated above and analyzing the resulting expressions leads 
to our final proposition:
Proposition 7: Denoting the present value of total welfare by W and comparing the 
effects of the different standards with each other as well as with the unregulated case 
reveals (see Appendix A.8):
Under average regulation, the gains in welfare compared to the unregulated case 
are a strictly increasing function of the discount factor .
Hence, despite of the firms’ strategic incentive to dampen the forthcoming stand-
ard, the introduction of an MQS based on the average quality initially supplied 
always leads to an increase in the present value of welfare. If the discount factor 
exceeds the threshold  ≈ 0.558 , the gains in welfare under average regulation are 
even higher than those obtained from applying the optimal MQS. In contrast, an 
MQS based on the high quality initially supplied leads only to a smaller increase in 
welfare that becomes even negative if the discount factor falls short of the threshold 
 ≈ 0.747.
Moreover, everything else equal, the gains in welfare under average regula-
tion are the higher, the higher is the discount factor applied. Of course, one might 
suspect that this result is trivial since it might be solely driven by the dimin-
ishing effect of discounting on the present value of welfare enjoyed in the sec-
ond period. To dispel this suspicion we also calculated normalized welfare 
W̃(qLt, qHt) ∶= [1∕(1 + 𝛿)] ⋅W1(qL1, qH1) + [𝛿∕(1 + 𝛿)] ⋅W2(qL2, qH2) . This transfor-
mation eliminates the direct effect of  on the weight attached to the second period 
and leaves only the strategic effects on the firms’ decisions. In Appendix A.8, we 








) , which indicates the gains in wel-
fare compared to the unregulated situation, is strictly increasing in .
Finally, we note that all results derived above rely on the assumption of a covered 
market. This requires that even the consumer with the lowest valuation of quality 
(i.e., i = a ) decides to buy the good. Since this consumer chooses variant L, the 
general condition for market-coverage in period t is u + aqLt − pLt > 0 . This implies 
that the baseline utility u has to exceed the threshold ût ∶= pLt − aqLt . Inserting poLt 
and qo
Lt






∕64𝛾 . This 
threshold is the lower, the higher is the minimum valuation of quality given by the 
parameter a . Hence, assuming a covered market in the unregulated case is justified if 
either the baseline utility or the minimum valuation of quality (or a suitable combi-
nation of both) is sufficiently high such that u > ûo
t
.
Concerning market-coverage under quality regulation, we concentrate on the 
more beneficial case of average regulation. Calculating along the same lines as 




 . As shown in Appendix A.9, 
both thresholds are strictly increasing in  . Hence, to derive a sufficient condition 
W∗ > Wa > Wo > Ws if 𝛿 < 0.558
Wa > W∗ > Wo > Ws if 0.558 < 𝛿 < 0.747
Wa > W∗ > Ws > Wo if 𝛿 > 0.747.
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for market coverage, it suffices to examine ûa
t





 for t = 1 . Consequently, if the market is covered without regulation 









 . I.e., even if the market is covered in the first 
period, it might switch to an uncovered one in the second period.
6  The case of more than two firms
Our analysis above concentrated on the case of duopoly although this might lead 
to results that are not robust if the number of firms becomes larger. To our best 
knowledge, Scarpa (1998) and Pezzino (2010) are the only two studies yielding a 
comprehensive analysis of this issue.22 Both authors concentrate on a constellation 
with three firms. In contrast to our approach, they assume that (1) the MQS is exog-
enously given such that it does not depend on the firms’ decisions, (2) the market is 
always uncovered and (3) there are only quality-dependent fixed cost. Contrary to 
the common findings for the case of duopoly, both authors show that introducing a 
binding MQS always reduces welfare.
Since our approach partly differs from Scarpa (1998) und Pezzino (2010), it is 
a priori unclear whether their result can be transferred to an MQS based on bench-
marking as studied in the present paper. We, therefore, analyzed an extended numer-
ical version of our model assuming that there is a third firm M that offers a quality 
between qLt and qHt . In line with the studies cited above, our results suggest that 
strict as well as average regulation will reduce welfare if there are three firms.23 The 
main economic reason is that with more than two firms the differences between the 
optimal and the unregulated qualities become almost negligible (see also Schmidt 
2009). Hence, introducing an MQS in such a situation implies harmful overregula-
tion even if the standard is based on benchmarking.
7  Conclusions
We analyzed a two-period model of an MQS based on benchmarking in a dif-
ferentiated duopoly. Although we are aware that our model is by far too sim-
ple to derive definite policy conclusions, we identified at least two interesting 
implications:
21 The economic reason is obvious since  = 3 implies a discount factor of  = 0 such that the firms’ 
decisions on quality in t = 1 completely ignore the effects on the forthcoming standard and there is no 
change compared to the unregulated case.
22 Scarpa (1998) considers Bertrand competition in the second stage, whereas Pezzino (2010) assumes 
Cournot competition.
23 The details of these calculations are available in the Online Resource 1.
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−First, in principle, a standard based on benchmarking can increase welfare 
but this approach should be handled with care since it entails the risk that the 
resulting standard is too severe and might even reduce welfare. Therefore, the 
average quality supplied in the market seems to be a more suitable benchmark 
than the high quality.
−Second, everything else equal, the gains in welfare resulting from a bench-
mark based on the average quality are the higher, the higher is the discount 
factor applied by the firms. For a given annual discount rate, however, the dis-
count factor will be the higher the shorter is the considered good’s useful lifes-
pan that determines the length of each period in our model. Consequently, our 
benchmarking approach seems to be particularly beneficial for goods that are 
not too long-lived.
However, the significance of our results is limited by several restrictive 
assumptions. Examples are the use of a quadratic cost function and the assump-
tion that the valuation of quality is uniformly distributed across consumers. The 
most serious limitation of our model presumably stems from the assumption of a 
covered market. In particular, our analysis has shown that a market, which is cov-
ered without regulation, might switch to an uncovered market after the MQS has 
been introduced in the second period.
Within the framework of our model, the assumption of full market-coverage 
is justified if either the baseline utility or the minimum valuation of quality (or 
a suitable combination of both) is sufficiently high. Whether this condition will 
be satisfied in practice, mainly depends on the specific good under considera-
tion and on the question which particular feature of this good is regulated by the 
MQS. Suitable examples where the above condition is likely to be satisfied are 
safety regulations of cars and pharmaceuticals as well as regulations concerning 
the quality of medical services and devices. Moreover, there exists a wide range 
of quality-regulated goods and services whose consumption is mandatory due to 
legal requirements. In this case, the market will automatically be covered irre-
spective of the magnitude of baseline utility or the minimum valuation of quality. 
Prominent examples are several kinds of mandatory safety products like cyclists’ 
helmets, smoke detectors or child safety seats for cars. Further examples relate to 
mandatory insurances for, e.g., health care or vehicle third-party liability.
Of course, in practice there also exist numerous cases of quality-regulated 
goods, where the assumption of full market-coverage is at least questionable. For 
instance, the regulated feature of goods sometimes relates to ecological charac-
teristics. Although environmental awareness seems to increase steadily, there 
are still a lot of consumers who do not care much about the environment. With 
respect to our model, this implies a rather small minimum valuation of quality. 
Hence, as far as the baseline utility of the regulated good is also small, market-
coverage is unlikely. In this case, it cannot be ruled out that after introducing an 
MQS overall welfare will decrease since the net utility of consumers at the lower-
quality end of the market who decide not to buy at all will drop to zero. However, 
the analytical difficulties associated with considering an uncovered market are 
left to future research.
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Appendix
Note: In this truncated version of the Appendix, we only provide the main ideas of 
our calculations and proofs. The complete Appendix is available in Online Resource 
2.
A.1 Check for leapfrogging
The equilibria calculated above require that leapfrogging can be ruled out. I.e., firm 
H has no incentive to choose a position qHt < qLt when firm L sticks to its equi-
librium position, and firm L has no incentive to choose a position qLt > qHt when 
firm H sticks to its equilibrium position. As a pre-requisite, we note that under both 
regulations leapfrogging by firm H in the second period can be excluded a priori 
since it would violate the minimum quality standard. Moreover, for the special case 
of = 3 (i.e., due to = 0 the firms completely ignore the effect of their decisions on 
the forthcoming standard), the unregulated equilibrium coincides with the regulated 
equilibria obtained for period t = 1 . Hence, the proof only needs to cover the cases 
of strict and average regulation.
The remaining proof proceeds as follows: First, we calculate the firms’ maximum 
possible profits in case of leapfrogging, denoted by ?̂?s
jt
 for strict regulation and ?̂?a
jt
 




 with the respective 













 for  ∈ [1, 3) such that leapfrogging can be 
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ruled out. With respect to firm L , the same holds in both periods. The only exception 





ever, if a cheap low-quality producer like firm L tries to penetrate the high-quality 
segment of the market, it will most likely be forced to change marketing strategies or 
distribution channels. Although the associated costs are not quantifiable, it is obvi-
ous that even arbitrary small costs will suffice to prevent leapfrogging.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To show that firm H will not try to achieve a non-binding standard under strict regu-
lation, we denote the quality that maximizes H′s profit for given qs
L1
 and under the 
restriction that the standard in t = 2 is non-binding by qn
H1





 holds. The reason is that a further reduction of quality would lead 
to an unnecessarily strong decrease in product differentiation. This, in turn, would 
reduce H′s profit in t = 1 without changing the outcome in t = 2 . In the second step, 







 is always 








To derive the results from comparing strict regulation with the unregulated case 
as stated in Proposition 1, we first calculate the respective differences for the consid-






 for the qualities offered by firm L in t = 1 ). 
The signs of the resulting differences depend only on the magnitude of  . Due to 
 =
√
9 − 8 and  ∈ (0, 1] , this magnitude is restricted to the domain  ∈ [1, 3) . 
Hence, the results stated in Proposition  1 can easily be obtained by plotting the 
graphs of the respective differences for  ∈ [1, 3) and by calculating zeros if neces-
sary. In the latter case, to derive the accompanying thresholds in terms of the dis-
count factor  the resulting zeros are transformed using  = (9 − 2)∕8.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In case of average regulation, a non-binding standard qa ≤ qo
Lt
 requires 
(qL1 + qH1)∕2 ≤ q
o
Lt
 . The main difference compared to strict regulation is that now 
both firms are able to achieve qa ≤ qo
Lt
 with their decision on quality in period t = 1 . 
The proof that such a strategy does not pay for firm H proceeds analogously to the 
corresponding proof for strict regulation outlined in  Appendix A.2. With respect to 
firm L , however, an additional complication occurs: The argument used in Appendix 
A.2, that due to the impact on product differentiation firm H will lower its quality 
only so far that the standard just does not bind, cannot directly be transferred to firm 
L . The reason is that for any given qH1 a reduction in qL1 would actually increase 
product differentiation. Nevertheless, the complete Appendix provided in Online 
Resource 2 shows that also firm L will not lower its quality any further than neces-
sary to guarantee qa ≤ qo
Lt
 . After this step, it is easy to show that the present value of 
L′s profit in case of a non-binding standard is always smaller than in the equilibrium 
calculated in Sect. 4.2.
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To derive the results from comparing average regulation with the unregulated 
case as stated in Proposition 2, we analyze the corresponding differences between 
variables following follow the same steps as already outlined in Appendix A.2.
A.4–A.8 Proof of Propositions 3–7
To derive the results stated in Propositions 3–7, we analyze the corresponding dif-
ferences between variables following the same steps as already outlined in Appendix 
A.2.
A.9 Market coverage under average regulation

















) for t = 1, 2 and show that the sign of 
the first derivatives with respect to  satisfy the condition 𝜕ûa
t
∕𝜕𝜆 > 0 for  ∈ [1, 3).
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